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       The paper explores the meaning of death in education to examine the possibility 
       of teaching death from a Heideggerian perspective. Teaching death itself appears 
       unlikely to achieve the aim of death education, overcomingthe fear of death,  if it 
       could not include one's own death, the utmost fear. The educational practices for 
       death appear to help students to understand what is to be learned in terms of the 
       need to attain knowledge whilst this still seems to leave  one own death behind, 
       to leave this utmost fear out of the picture. In this paper, considering other's 
      death is defined as impersonalised death. In  Heidegger'sphilosophy, human 
       beings appear possible to consider their own death since death is no more than 
       being-toward-death: the human being lives in a condition in which  'I am dying' 
      from the birth. Besides, the care-structure of Dasein involves its being-ahead-of-
      itself and the anticipating of death opens the possibility of being authentic. 
       Therefore, death education can consider the issue,  one's own death as the most 
      fear. Finally, wellbeing in educational practices for death is approached as a 
       state of happiness in a sense of contingency. In  Heidegger's analysis contingency 
       appears in human mortality and temporality in relation to death as existential 
       characteristics of Dasein. 
It is a common saying in thanatology (the study of death and dying) that  'wellbeing is well-
dying'. Although this phrase may seem to be relevant mostly to people who are old and nearing 
death, the basic concept of wellbeing here regards dying as part of living. In this respect death 
education in general also has dragged death into educational practice as a subject of wellbeing. 
The foundation of the idea is that we can come to see our lives as more meaningful through 
reflecting on death. 
 At this point death education seems to be possible to teach death in the same way of teaching 
other subjects and topics. When we teach math, for instance, it is assumed that students can 
actually understand, or have the ability to acquire an understanding of, concepts of number, 
space, and so on, and this assumption is supported by philosophy and psychology, etc. In 
contrast, there is little reason to believe that by studying death as a subject children can actually 
come to understand it or overcome the fear of death, which death education supposedly aims 
 for.' 
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 Besides, what is taught in death education tends to cover across those social and cultural 
aspects that are reflected in others' deaths whilst little attention seems to be paid on death itself, 
especially one's own death. And yet it seems understandable that it must be others' deaths that 
are the focus of attention since no one can experience their own death. 
 My starting point is the following question: Can death be taught in such as way as to address 
the meaning of one's own death. In doing so, I want to discover ways in which, in such 
educational practice, an understanding of human mortality in Heideggerian terms can be realised. 
THE PRACTICE OF DEATH EDUCATION 
On the way to find the meaning of death, it is necessary here to consider how death education 
has been conducted, in which the assumption is made that death is something to be taught. In this 
respect I would like to briefly explore the practices of current death education for our relation to 
death. 
 Unlike the academic research in relation to death, the public attitude toward death appears, 
according to a survey conducted by BBC  (ICM research, 2006; Tsiris et al, 2011, p. 97), to have 
changed little over the last half of the century. In the words of Philippe Aries, there is, in contrast 
to the past, a tendency to hide death in darkness, away from our cheerful society (Aries,  1998). 
In fact, for the majority of people death is still a subject that they would not wish to consider in 
daily life until it is absolutely inevitable. Issues related to death are often, as a result, matters of 
social taboo, with thoughts hidden from the public and an  internalisation of fear. 
 In this respect death education has emphasised that death should be discussed openly without 
hesitation or fear, so that reflecting on death enriches our lives and makes them more 
meaningful. The result of death education, as a consequence, is expected as a desire to live 
happily (or, we may say, for  'wellbeing') while facing up to tragedy and psychological trauma, 
and all the shadow images of these. 
 The dimension of aims in death education is roughly divided into an interpretation of death 
that teaches 1) that there are diverse aspects of death and dying, 2) that we are consumers of 
medical and funeral services, 3) that we can improve our living quality through careful 
consideration of death, 4) that we can manage our lives well in relation to the deaths of others 
as well as to our own death, and 5) that we need to make up our minds about death in social and 
ethical terms (Gibson, Robert and Buttery, 1982, p.  14). Through the dimensions, death 
education supposedly accomplishes its purpose by teaching social and ethical values, and 
attitudes and understandings appropriate to death, and the fear of death can be overcome by 
sharing images of death. 
  Death education has been practised in several ways: a part of school curriculum and life-long 
education, through literature for children, and as a part of health welfare. Among the various 
means, it is worth introducing one of the notable cases of death education that has recently been 
conducted in relation to health promotion and the performing arts. This is called the  'St 
Christopher's Schools Project', and it was launched by St Christopher's Hospice in London, UK. 
Over the last six years (2005-2011) the schools project has built up a relationship between 
students in the local primary schools and terminal patients at St Christopher's. The music and 
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arts in this project play a major role in developing the relationship, with the support of the arts 
team from the organisation. The beauty of the schools project is, especially, its philosophy, 
which is based on the local community, in which the view is taken that,  'in order to begin to 
unravel the complexities of death education and community involvement, vital and pressing 
questions for hospices and end of life care services must be based on how communities can 
become engaged in such matters' (Hartley, 2011; Tsiris et  al., 2011, p. 100). 
 Such approaches are particularly valuable in an age when death tends to be forgotten in order 
to awaken the public in a creative way to the existence of death, from young students to the 
terminally ill patients. Through death education, it is likely that the participants will come to 
understand what is to be learned in terms of the need to attain knowledge through experience out 
in the community. But this still seems, however, to leave one's own death behind, to leave this 
utmost fear out of the picture. 
IMPERSONALISED DEATH 
The aim of death education, conducted along these lines, is to understand death and overcome 
the fear of death. It is supposedly believed that once we admit death as a part of living, we can 
be relatively relieved out of the fear in death and eventually confront death in a cheerful way 
(Deeken, 2002). In general terms, open discussion on death itself appears a brave enough way 
to accomplish one of the purposes in death education, which is to understand death, no matter 
whose death is. And it is true that death education has deliberately served to bring death to 
people's attention. But then why should one's own death be a problem? 
 No fear or anxiety over any death is greater than that regarding one's own death. One's own 
death eradicates everything and brings all to nothing. Let us suppose that an influential teacher 
declares that death is a part of living so that we must not be afraid but bravely confront it and 
that this is a means to a happy  life. But it hardly seems convincing that death is something that 
we can coolly and confidently face up to: when it comes to myself or my family or friends, when 
it comes into our concrete lives, it comes as something dreadful no matter how much we have 
considerately learned about death, not matter how much we have learned to reason through what 
happens. The death that we are meant to experience is not something we experience ourselves. 
Hence, it remains uncertain what it is we are to  'face up to' in death education. If it is genuinely 
to deal with the fear of death, the challenge must be taken up of overcoming my utmost fear, fear 
of my death. 
 On the contrary, In social and cultural contexts, what students encounter in death education is 
death as events or as objects of experience, happening outside of themselves, and with various 
forms of cultural symbolisation. Consequently, the opinions that children come to form about 
death will depend on this understanding of cultural practice, which does not even come close to 
their own concrete death. 
 Even in the case of therapeutic approaches or grief counselling, which constitutes a large part 
of death education, the therapy mainly focuses on overcoming grief by sharing feelings with 
others. Although children who are bereaved may make up their own minds about death, this will 
hardly be related to the deaths of others and not to their own death. In this case the fear of death 
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still remains since one's own death is not in question when death is understood primarily in 
terms of a shared or generalized anxiety. 
 The problem is that the attitude to another's death may be something impersonal (Kneller, 
1958, p. 109). This impersonal attitude can exist alongside the illusion that one can live forever, 
since the dead person is not oneself. Asking whose death is in question in current educational 
practice reveals the fact that it is the other's death that is taken as the means to overcome the fear 
of death. 
 It might be said that considering other's death may allow us to think of our own death, perhaps 
as a result of the experience of the grief. Indeed, it might be claimed, death education practice 
is intended to lead us to a point where we can face up to the fact that we all die, and this can 
engender an authentic understanding of death and enable us to overcome our fear. However, it 
can also fail to do this since the image of death so often distorts the way that death must really 
come to us. As Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith and Paul Standish put this: 
    Here in particular there seems to be the possibility of the imaginative, vicarious confrontation 
    with the experience of death and the topic of death is something to which young people can 
    readily to drawn. Authenticity of aesthetic experience seems to be of critical important in arts 
    education, but the possibilities of fantasy and distortion that arise in relation to death are also 
    evident (Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2007, p. 92). 
  In this respect death education needs to avoid creating a kind of fashionable mystique of death, 
which itself will stand in the way of young people considering better the nature of their 
mortality. At the same time, it remains to be proved that it is possible to convert the culture of 
death, a consideration of the deaths of others, into an understanding of one's own death. At this 
point, a question inevitably arises that how individuals turn from these images of other's death 
towards the death that is our own. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDERSTANDING MY DEATH 
Although death education mostly deals with the deaths of others as discussed above, it is 
implausible to insist that we are not able to understand our own death at all. Rather, death seems 
to appear from time to time in forms of anxiety. Heidegger explains that even when Dasein 
succumbs to its inauthentic existence as  'the They' (Das Man)2 there is also the fear of death 
implicitly. 
  George Kneller, writing with extensive reference to the existentialists of the middle of 20th 
century, argues that instead of masking the  'awfulness' of death, we should learn to anticipate 
it and actually  'run forward (vorlaufen) to meet it' (Kneller, 1958, pp.  109-110)  —echoing 
Heidegger's philosophy, which is taken as one source of existentialism. Kneller's suggestion 
might be adopted as a maxim: children should face up to their own death in order that they 
overcome the fear of death and can live well. In the light of Kneller's analysis, there are two 
questions that follow: one is that whether one can in practice face up to one's own death, and 
the other is what meeting death means. The former question raises the suspicion that Kneller's 
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suggestion, although it seems to be radical, in fact remains within the realm of a kind of 
consolation. The latter purports to catch the spirit of  'run forward' and anticipation, which is to 
be derived from death itself. In my view these questions are not far from each other, and rather 
that answering the latter along, one can also answer the two questions simultaneously by 
analysing what the former implies. 
 To overcome the utmost fear, which comes from one's own death in the form of anxiety, and 
to avoid accepting distorting images of death, we must come to the point where we learn to 
anticipate it and run forward to meet it. As Kneller emphasises, this idea comes from 
Heidegger's philosophy: anticipation and running forward are Heidegger's own terms for 
describing the character of human being or, as he prefers to put this, Dasein.3 Heidegger 
understands Dasein as a being-toward-death, which implies that it is a condition of human being 
that I am in dying: 
   If suchpointed formulations mean anything at all (the basic certainty of Dasein itself), then the 
   appropriate statement pertaining to Dasein in its being would have to be sum moribundus  PI am 
    in  dying')  ,  moribundus not as someone gravely ill or wounded, but insofar as I am, I am 
   moribundus. The moribundus first gives the sum its sense (Heidegger, 1985, p. 317, the square 
    bracketed parenthesis is mine). 
 However, death does not flow up from those events that are the deaths of others. The point is 
rather that Dasein is already constructed by care  (Sorge),4 in which the human being, in its 
ontologico-existential structure, is explained by being-ahead-of-itself as possibility: this allows 
Dasein to consider its own death as possibility of  impossibility.' In the structure of human being, 
anticipation (Vorlaufen) is possible as a form of being ahead-of-itself. Therefore, it is not 
enough to say that the human being can think of death but exists in dying, which indicates the 
mortality of Dasein from its own existence. 
 Furthermore, it is the ontological understanding of death, the basis of Dasein's existence, that 
allows Dasein its freedom. In Heidegger's ontology, what one's own death encloses is 
nothingness (das  Nichts), which is an extremity of Dasein's anxiety. Confronting nothingness, 
Dasein realises its  'thrown' situation in the world, which is also a dimension of care. In this 
thrownness, Dasein is encouraged to choose and decide to be itself in the name of freedom, apart 
from what  'they' force Dasein to be. This also reveals that Dasein is a being that must throw 
itself into a world in which it is already thrown. Throwing itself is possible as Dasein is a form 
of being ahead of itself. In anticipation (Vorlaufen) the possibility opens up for Dasein of a form 
of authenticity. Only if Dasein anticipates its own death can it be in freedom, the way of 
authenticity. Heidegger describes the relation between freedom and anticipation as follows: 
    Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the  they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
   possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by  concernful solicitude, but of being itself, 
    rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the 
    illusions of the  'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
   311). 
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 Here we find a clue to the meaning of meeting death. This is that we are, in our thrown 
structure, beings in dying but with the possibility of being free from the  'they' through the 
anticipation of our own death. This is a matter less of the emotional impact of death and more 
to do with the character of human being that is constructed as a result of mortality. What Hei 
degger's philosophy implies in this analysis of death is that Dasein has the possibility of taking 
its death as an issue by means of which if can be free from They. The idea of meeting death must 
be understood in terms of the ontological character of Dasein, which is  care.' 
 This does not imply that we should insist on children virtually meeting death.  'Meeting 
death' in this case might be wrongly understood in terms of a kind of suicidal orientation. Rather 
it is on our recognition that we are beings making a decision to be authentic and that this holds 
the possibility of understanding one of our existential conditions—that is, death itself. Therefore, 
as far as we exist, our own death can be encountered in either an authentic or an inauthentic 
 way.' 
 What should be emphasised here, however, is that being-toward-death does not suggest some 
kind of  technical approach in education. There have been many attempts to apply Heidegger's 
philosophy in education but these have run into problems—because of unclarity over 
Heidegger's philosophy and because of its questionable relation to educational, moral or social 
 issues.' While being aware of the limitations of his thought in relation to education, the meaning 
of death in  Heidegger's ontology I want to explore how much his philosophy explains or 
enriches educational thinking by pursuing the question: what is the meaning of death in 
 Heidegger's ontology in relation to the concept of wellbeing in death education? 
WELLBEING AS BEING-TOWARD-DEATH 
In death education, logic is constructed to the effect that overcoming the fear of death leaves our 
lives in a state of happiness, as a dimension of our wellbeing. In what sense then can this be seen 
in terms of happiness? In this relation it is worthy to explore Heidegger's analysis on Being due 
to the relation with death and truth. 
 The question of the meaning of death in Heidegger's ontology can be approached in the 
contexts of his books, Being and Time and Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, the latter of 
which can in certain respects be seen as the second part of the former. Both books show his 
intentions in his ontological analysis of death, specifically his linking of mortality and 
temporality. In the light of this the question can be raised of whether the concept of wellbeing 
can in the end relate to death. 
 On the one hand, what is emphasised in the phrase, Dasein is in dying, is the finitude of its 
existence. On the other hand, human being is not finite in terms of ontological understanding of 
Being, which means that the human being can imagine or understand Being in a way that goes 
beyond human perception. As simply noticeable from the title, Being and Time, the main focus 
of this book is to find the relation of time in the question of Being. Heidegger expects to relate 
 `the following series—of the understanding of Being, the transcendence of man, the formative 
comportment toward beings, and the historical happening in world history of man—to truth and 
untruth, which all are based on an understanding of Being as well as oriented in respect to 
 ©  2012 The Author
 104  S.  Yun 
time' (Heidegger, 1991, p. 199). In this process he arrives at his affirmation of the temporality 
of Dasein, which being-toward-death supports. 
 Heidegger suggests that time is always the basis of subjectivity, which is the opposite to the 
conventional view on temporality, which takes it to be an object of experience (p. 198). Dasein 
itself is constituted out of present, future, and past, and death is constitutive of the futurity of 
Dasein: as soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die (Heidegger, 1961, p. 289). 
This is also found in his words in the Davos debate with Ernst Cassirer in 1929. Heidegger states 
the need: 
    To bring out the temporality of Dasein with reference to the possibility of the understanding of 
   Being. And it is with respect to this that all problems are oriented. In one direction, the analysis 
    of death has the function of bringing out the radical futurity of Dasein, but not of producing an 
    altogether final and metaphysical thesis concerning the essence of death (Heidegger, 1991, p. 
   199). 
 When we look at death as mortality and temporality in Heidegger's analysis, on the one hand, 
the concept of being-toward-death does not guarantee wellbeing in the sense assumed in 
contemporary practices of death education: it offers no assurance that we shall live happily. 
Rather, it is the contingency of beings that Heidegger tries to demonstrate on the way of 
understanding Being. It seems then that the being-toward-death is not compatible with wellbeing. 
 On the other hand, if we consider the happiness that is implied in wellbeing in terms of an 
older sense of happy, in terms, that is, of happenstance, then perhaps the idea that death 
education might contribute to wellbeing can be retrieved. Happenstance refers to  'the nature of 
chance, including the chance that things may work out well, and this implies the contingency of 
what happens to happen, and an openness to the possibility of new possibilities' (Lear, 2000, p. 
129; Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2007, p. 82). This is compatible with the manifold structure 
of Dasein as contingency. 
CONCLUSION 
My starting question has become a question of the possibility of teaching death from a 
Heideggerian perspective. What we have seen is that the familiar aim of death education— 
overcoming the fear of death so that we can live happily—is likely to turn away from one's own 
death, the utmost fear. Rather what death education teaches is that a culture of death embedded 
in a series of opinions and information. 
 We saw also how Kneller insists on the need to face up to one's own death, as implied by 
Heidegger's philosophy, but it was unclear how the meaning of meeting death was to be 
interpreted in educational practice. In Heidegger, it appeared possible for human beings to 
consider their own death since, as human,  'I am in dying' from birth. Besides, the care-structure 
(Sorge) of Dasein was seen in terms of Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself, which means that the 
anticipation (Vorlaufen) of death gives some authenticity to the notion of meeting death. 
Therefore, death education is possible if one can take up the issue of one's own death as the 
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greatest fear to overcome. Furthermore, death appears in Heidegger's analysis of human 
mortality and temporality as existential characteristics of beings that allow the possibility of 
finding the meaning of Being. This, I have tried to show, may be compatible with wellbeing 
insofar as this is understood in terms of contingency. 
 The relation of Heidegger's philosophy to death education appears limited except outside of 
the claim that death can be taught in the light of its ontological importance. In this paper I have 
tried to explore the possibility of teaching death, and this has led me towards the possibility of 
teaching happiness in terms of contingency. What Heidegger's philosophy shows is not how this 
might be taught but rather its possibility. Although Heidegger gives few direct answers for 
educational practice, he raises questions regarding more knowledge and truth, and the 
relationship between the student and the teacher, all of which address us to the need for 
rethinking what we do in education. In this respect Heidegger's philosophy is not the end of a 
question, but a starting point for education that few have ever reached before. 
NOTES 
  1. For more information on the brief history of death education, see Wass, H. (2004). 
 2. The They (Das man) is one of Heidegger's unique term indicating ordinary people who live daily life with little 
    awareness on their existence. Heidegger often refers to the They as Dasein's being in an unauthentic way. 
  3. Heidegger deliberately avoids such terms as  'human being' or  'man' on the grounds that these are fatefully 
    burdened by associations and connotations that deeply distort the nature of our being-in-the-world, and he adopts 
    instead the term  'Dasein', which means literally  'being-there'. 
 4. Heidegger shows that the inner character of time is part of the ontological structure of Dasein. This is found in 
    Care (Sorge), which is a structure of Dasein, and the ancient fable concerning the demi-goddess Cura, which 
    Heidegger quotes in Being and Time, is a story of how the human being was named. Care is an existential 
    structure, which indicates Being-ahead-of oneself, in connection with Dasein's facticity and its fallenness into the 
    world (Geworfenheit). This structure corresponds to the structure of time. Besides, Heidegger quotes the ancient 
    fable, a story of how Saturn (the god of time) named humans in the course of a dispute between Jupiter, Earth, 
    and Care. The story helps to show why Dasein's existential-ontological structure is Care. At the same time, 
    Heidegger picks up the point that it is in time that the  'primordial' structure of human being is found. The 
    possibility of anticipation in being-toward-death is also supported in the structure of care. In this way, the futurity 
    of Dasein is shown by death. 
 5. It is worthy to compare the meaning of death in Heidegger's philosophy to the conception found in Levinas. While 
    death is the phenomenon of freedom for Heidegger, it is the experience of dreadful pain for Levinas. In Heidegger, 
    freedom appears as to be an authentic existence in the form of being forward death. Experiencing the possibility 
    of impossibility which indicates death is related to the freedom of Dasein whereas the ontical death is experienced 
    in pain according to Levinas. He states that  'death is an event of reaching the ultimate limitation of possibility for 
    us being in agony while it is an event of freedom for Heidegger' (Levinas, 2001, p. 78). Due to the differences 
    in interpretation, death is the impossibility of possibility for Levinas whilst it is the possibility of impossibility for 
    Heidegger (Kang, 2001, p. 143). In my view, Heidegger focuses on rather the ontological features of Dasein or 
    oneself while Levinas considers more on others out of the painful co-experience in relation to death. Levinas' 
    interpretation on death is vividly considerable to build a co-existence relationship with others. In this article, 
    however, the meaning of death is mainly dealt with the possibility that one can actually understand one's own 
    death. In Heidegger's philosophy, it appears possible based on the fact of existence. 
  6. Care (Sorge) in Heidegger's sense refers to the way that for Dasein things matter; something is always at stake. 
    This is not to be confused with certain more familiar and sentimental senses of the term or with its prominence 
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     in  'care ethics'. 
 7. In early Heidegger, the concept of authenticity and unauthenticity frequently appears. Both concepts are seldom 
    related to the matter of right or wrong. The concepts are related to Heidegger's understanding on the contingency 
    of truth.  'Truth itself is unified with the structure of transcendence on the most intimate level in order for Dasein 
    to be a being open to others and to itself. We are a being which holds itself in the unconcealedness of beings. To 
    hold oneself in this way in the openness of beings is what I describe as Being-in-truth, and I go further and say: 
    on the grounds of the  finitude of the Being-in-truth of human being, there exists at the same time a Being-in-
    untruth. Untruth belongs to the innermost core of the structure of Dasein' (Heidegger, 1991, p. 197). According 
    to Heidegger, truth and untruth consist of Dasein. Therefore, being authentic is on the decision 
    (Entschlossenheit) of Dasein holding the possibility of being unauthentic. 
 8. One argument is found in the field of philosophy and education particularly on death. In the 1960s, when 
    existentialism was widely influential, an argument was raised on applying Heidegger's analysis of death in the 
    educational field for three years. The key point of the argument is that there is little chance of applying 
    Heidegger's philosophy in education and an even greater possibility that he will be misread. Professor Donald 
    Vandenberg took issue with Existentialism and Education by G. F. Kneller, claiming at first that Kneller was 
    misreading Heidegger, then Anthony DeSoto protested against Vandenberg's criticism on the grounds that it was 
    Kneller' intention in the book was only to interpret Heidegger's thought in relation to education. Finally, in the 
    following year, Vandenberg made clear his point of view, saying that he was trying to read Heidegger correctly 
    while missing the educational implications. (See more, Vandenberg, D. (1965), `Kneller, Heidegger, and 
    Death', Educational Theory, 15(2), pp. 217-229; Desoto, A. E. (1966),  Ileidegger, Kneller, and Vandenberg', 
    Educational Theory, 16(3), pp. 239-241; Vandenberg, D. (1967),  `Kneller, Heidegger, And Death', Educational 
    Theory,  17  (2)  , pp. 176-177). 
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